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By Daniel S. Goldberg* 
INTRODUCTION 
Classifying an entity for tax purposes as either a partnership or a cor-
poration has received a great deal of attention for many years. 1 What is 
at stake, first and foremost, is the potential avoidance of entity-level tax-
ation. A partnership is entitled to pass-through treatment. Under this 
treatment, partnership income is attributed to the partners, who are sub-
ject to tax on that income. The partnership itself is not subject to tax. 2 
In addition, and as a corollary to pass-through treatment, losses and tax 
credits also pass through to the partners. 3 These items need not await 
partnership income or tax on that income to be of use to the partners. 4 
In contrast, a corporation, other than one electing S corporation status 
is a taxable entity that must pay tax on its net income.5 Distributions of 
that net income, in general, are also taxable to the corporation's share-
holders as dividends, which are treated as ordinary income. 6 As a result, 
a second layer of income tax is imposed on that income. Moreover, cor-
porate losses do not pass through to the shareholders, and therefore can-
not be used to offset the shareholders' other income. 
Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) are a relatively new form of business 
entity in the United States, although they do have foreign counterparts 
of longer standing. 7 An LLC resembles a partnership in some respects and 
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B. I968, University of Rochester; 
J.D. I97I, Harvard Law School. The author would like to thank Professor Robert I. Keller 
and Professor Mark A. Sargent for their helpful comments on drafts of this Article. 
I. See infra text at notes 29-48, for a brief history of the endeavor. 
2. See l.R.C. § 70I (1988). 
3. ld. § 702 (1988 & Supp. V I993). 
4. Note that the limitation on the use of passive activity losses and credits under l.R.C. 
§ 469 is applied at the partner level. 
5. I. R.C. § II (1988 & Supp. V I993). 
6. /d. § 6I (a)(7). 
7. Limited liability for all members of an association is a characteristic of a number of 
foreign organizations including for example, the Latin American limitada and the German 
Gesellschaft mit beschrenkter Haftung (GmbH). See Michael Wallace Gordon, Joint Business 
Ventures in the Central American Market, 2I VAND. L. REv. 3I5 (1968). 
995 
HeinOnline -- 50 Bus. Law. 996 1994-1995
996 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 50, May 1995 
a corporation in others. An LLC's tax treatment, therefore, depends upon 
how the tax law classifies it-as a partnership or as a corporation. Thus, 
the tax policy issues involved in LLC classification are crucial. 
LLCs, under current law, are classified as partnerships for federal in-
come tax purposes if they satisfy the classification test set forth in the 
Treasury Regulations;8 LLCs generally do so. As such, they are "pass-
through" entities in that the LLC does not pay tax. Instead, taxable income 
is computed at the LLC level, and each LLC member is charged with a 
proportionate amount of the LLC's income or losses. In contrast, under 
current law, if an LLC does not satisfy the classification test, it will be 
taxed as a corporation, which is a tax-paying entity whose income is subject 
to a separate level of tax. 
Recently, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) announced that it 
is considering simplifying the classification regulations to allow taxpayers 
to treat domestic unincorporated business organizations as partnerships 
or associations (taxable as corporations)9 on an elective basis. 10 Under this 
proposal, therefore, an LLC would be treated as a partnership, unless it 
elected otherwise, or its classification was determined under another In-
ternal Revenue Code provision. For example, an LLC whose interests were 
publicly traded would be taxed as a corporation 11 and the proposal would 
not change that classification. 12 A hearing on the issue is scheduled for 
July 20, 1995. 13 If the Treasury adopts this elective approach, the limited 
liability company should become the non-public structure of choice, leav-
ing the closely held corporation as a vehicle for special situations. 14 
The tax treatment of LLCs has broad implications for the federal rev-
enue. To the extent a business can be conducted through an LLC (offering 
limited liability to its members) instead of through a corporation, an entire 
8. Treas. Reg. § 30 I. 7701-2 (as amended 1993); id. § 30 I. 7701-3 (1967). 
9. See id. § 30 I. 7701-2 (as amended in 1993). 
10. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7. 
II. I.R.C. § 7704 (1988). 
12. I.R.C. § 7704, in general, treats publicly traded partnerships as corporations. Section 
7704(b) defines a publicly traded partnership as a corporation "if (I) interests in such part-
nership are traded on an established securities market, or (2) interests in such partnership 
are readily tradable on a secondary market (or the substantial equivalent thereof)." An 
exception from corporate treatment is made for publicly traded partnerships with passive-
type income. /d. § 7704(c). All of these terms are or will be further defined and explained 
in Treasury Regulations promulgated under the section. For the meantime, the IRS has issued 
guidelines for the administration of the section (see I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386), 
and has issued proposed regulations generally following those guidelines with certain mod-
ifications. I.R.S. Notice 95-28, 1995-21 I.R.B. 9, instructs taxpayers to rely on the guidelines 
set forth in the 1988 Notice, until regulations have been issued in final form. 
13. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, supra note 10. 
14. Another generation of limited liability "pass-through" entities has emerged recently. 
These are known as "Limited Liability Partnerships" or "LLPs." LLPs are tailored for profes-
sional service practices but have proliferated, and may continue to proliferate, outside of 
that sphere. 
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level of tax can be avoided. The corporate alternative for accomplishing 
pass-through treatment, the S Corporation, is inadequate for many busi-
ness situations. S Corporation qualification is limited with regard to the 
number and identity of permissible shareholders. 15 In addition, S Cor-
poration corporate structure is inflexible because of the one class of stock 
requirement. 16 As a result, pass-through treatment is foregone by busi-
nesses that require corporate structure and are uncomfortable with the 
relatively new LLC form. 17 Proliferation of LLCs, therefore, theoretically 
could cause a substantial reduction in federal revenue collections. It is 
likely, however, that many firms are already achieving optimal tax treat-
ment through the more cumbersome and costly mechanism of the limited 
partnership, the S corporation, or the general partnership, or even the C 
corporation whose operating profits are paid out as salary to its owner-
employees. A shift to an elective regime, therefore, may not so much drain 
the revenue as reduce the costs of obtaining the optimal tax status. In any 
event, the proliferation of LLCs, in large measure, would accomplish the 
integration of business and individual taxation. Accordingly, the growth 
of LLCs poses a very important policy issue for the federal income tax 
system. 
This Article considers alternative methods of classification of LLCs that 
could improve upon the Treasury's current classification test set forth in 
the Treasury Regulations. In order to evaluate these alternative methods, 
one must first understand the entity classification policy issues confronting 
the Treasury and the current state of the law. Accordingly, this Article will 
consider those policy issues and the test currently employed in the Treasury 
Regulations. In this connection, the Article examines the history and ap-
plication of that test and its shortcomings in adequately dealing with the 
basic policy issues involved in classification. It then suggests that the Trea-
sury or Congress adopt an alternative method of classification and sets 
forth and critiques four such alternative methods. The Article concludes 
that any of these four methods would be preferable to the Treasury's 
current method, with some substantially more preferable than others, and 
15. I.R.C. § 136l(b)(l)(A), (B) & (C) (1988). 
16. /d. § 1361 (b)(! )(D) (1988). 
17. While taxpayers currently can use S Corporations to avoid the corporate level tax on 
operating profits, LLCs offer substantially more flexibility in accomplishing an economic 
sharing arrangement among equity owners more complicated than a straight pro rata sharing. 
Whereas S Corporations can only issue a single class of stock (I.R.C. § 136l(b)(l)(D)), LLC 
members can share profits, losses, and distributions in the same, more complex manner as 
partners can share such partnership items. In addition, partnership tax treatment is generally 
preferential to S Corporation tax treatment. For example, partnership tax treatment permits 
more generous loss pass-through by including entity level debt in the partners' outside basis. 
Also, S Corporations, under current tax law, sometimes involve double level tax resulting 
from shareholder transactions. In contrast, partnership taxation treatment that would apply 
to LLCs allows for avoidance of these problems. See l.R.C. §§ 734(b), 743(b) and 754 (1988). 
Accordingly, LLCs treated as partnerships can avoid double taxation entirely. 
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considers the policy implications of the Treasury's unwillingness, so far, 
to abandon its current classification test. 
ENTITY CLASSIFICATION 
THE SHIFTING POLICY FOCUS 
The underlying policy issue involved with regard to entity classification 
is whether business entities should be taxed as separate entities or should 
be permitted pass-through treatment or some other form of integration 
treatment so that income will be taxed at only one level. If integration is 
rejected and some business entities are to be taxed at the entity level, then 
policymakers must decide which entities are to be subject to that extra 
level of tax. That decision should be grounded on some policy objective, 
that is, to achieve some economic goal or simply to achieve fairness. Cur-
rent policy achieves neither. 
From the inception of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), a two-tier 
structure of taxation has been in force for corporations. 18 Yet the Code 
generally treated partnerships, even before the enactment of subchapter 
Kin 1954,19 as aggregations of their partners and therefore not as separate 
taxable entities. 20 This treatment made sense, particularly with respect to 
general partnerships, which were the prevailing form of partnership in 
existence prior to the latter part of the 1960s (although the limited part-
nership structure has a very long history in the United States, dating back 
to the first half of the nineteenth century), because the partners maintained 
almost unlimited control over the business and each remained liable for 
all of the businesses' obligations. In a very real sense, each partner had 
ownership of, control over, and responsibility for the business, and 
through contributions and the agreement for sharing of profits and losses, 
essentially owned an undivided pro rata share of the business. 
18. See BoRIS I. BITIKER & jAMES S. EusTICE, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS~ 1.01 (6th ed. 1994); jAMES S. EUSTICE ET AL., THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1986: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY~ 2.02 (1987) (discussing history of COr· 
porate tax rates); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990); Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: 
An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977). 
19. Act of Aug. I 6, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 250. 
20. See ARTHUR B. WILLIS, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 11-12, 129-30 (1957), 
indicating that prior to the 1954 Code, the tax treatment of a partnership and its constituent 
partners depended upon whether, under applicable state law, it was an aggregate of partners 
undertaking joint effort, or an entity, separate and distinct from its members. The pure 
aggregate theory of partnership taxation treats the partnership as a conduit through which 
the partners own interests in both the partnership's income as well as in the partnership's 
property. This theory does not treat the partnership as a separate entity, but rather as a 
means for the centralized reporting of tax information. The 1954 Code adopted both ag-
gregate and entity features. See Kimberly K. Francev, The Fate of the Fully-Divested Lower-Tier 
Partnership: Does the IRS Recognize the Body?, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 201 (1994); Donald J. 
Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership Law, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. I (1988). 
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The proliferation of limited partnerships beginning in the late 1960s 
brought partnerships somewhat closer to corporations in their character.21 
Under applicable state limited partnership laws, a limited partner theo-
retically can exercise only limited control over the partnership and no day-
to-day control over its business. 22 In that sense, a limited partner's rela-
tionship to the partnership is much closer to the shareholder's relationship 
to a corporation than it is to the general partner's relationship to a part-
nership. Nevertheless, a limited partnership is generally treated as a part-
nership under the tax law so long as at least two of the four corporate 
characteristic criteria are not present. 23 
The final step in this progression of entity creation is that of LLCs, 
which, as outlined earlier, bear an even stronger resemblance to corpo-
rations than do limited partnerships. Unlike a limited partnership, in which 
a general partner has personal liability to third parties for the recourse 
debts of the partnership,24 an LLC has no such member who bears that 
responsibility for LLC debts. 25 As such, all LLC members can view the 
operations of the LLC as not affecting their personal assets other than 
those invested in the LLC. Accordingly, LLC members are able to view 
their membership interest more passively, and relate to the LLC in a 
fashion more similar to the way shareholders relate to a corporation than 
to the way general partners, in the traditional model, relate to a partner-
ship. 
With this continuum in mind, the issue confronting the government in 
classifying an organization as either a two-level tax organization or a one-
level tax organization is an important one with significant economic con-
sequences, but yet a difficult one. This Article proposes that the classifi-
cation issue should not be resolved by counting of corporate character-
istics, the artificial mechanism employed under the current and 
longstanding Treasury Regulations,26 but rather should be resolved by 
21. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 
§§ 11.01 (f), 11.02(a) & (b) (1993 & Supp. 1994). For example, limited partnership laws were 
adopted in New York and Connecticutt in 1822, and in Pennsylvania in 1836. The Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) was drafted in 1916, two years after the Uniform Partnership 
Act (UPA), and was adopted first in Illinois and Pennsylvania in 1917, in New York in 1922, 
and by the 1970s, throughout the United States. /d. § 11.02(b). In 1976, it was replaced by 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, and by an amended version in 1985. /d. 
22. During the 1970s and 1980s, limited partnerships became the principal vehicle for 
tax shelter investors. /d. § 11.01([). REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303 (1985). 
23. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2(a)(3), -3{b)(1); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), 
acq. 1979-2 C.B.2. In Larson, the court held that an entity organized as a limited partnership 
that possessed the corporate characteristics of centralized management and free transfera-
bility of interests, but lacked continuity of life and limited liability, was taxable as a partnership. 
/d. at 185-86. 
24. See REv. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303. 
25. See, e.g., Mo. CooE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A-301 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 42:2B-23 (West Supp. 1994). 
26. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 1993). 
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determining what policy objective is achieved by permitting either inte-
gration treatment or two-tier taxation. 
In other words, the classification issue should be resolved by reference 
to the policy objective. Classification might be accomplished by identifying 
the benefits associated with conducting business in corporate form that 
justify an entity-level of taxation that do not exist in the case of a business 
conducted in partnership form, which enjoys a single level of taxation. It 
might also be answered by reference to fiscal or economic policy objectives 
in maintaining or abrogating a two-tier corporate income tax structure. 
THE TREASURY REGULATIONS' "CORPORATE 
CHARACTERISTICS'' 
The Treasury Regulations, in their current form, use four factors or 
characteristics to distinguish entities (partnerships or LLCs) treated as 
partnerships for federal income tax purposes from entities treated as as-
sociations taxable as corporations. Those factors are the following: (i) con-
tinuity of life; (ii) centralized management; (iii) limited liability; and (iv) 
free transferability of interests. 27 In order to be classified as a partnership, 
the entity must lack at least two of these characteristics. 28 
History 
The history of this four factor test underscores the policy myopia in-
herent in the test. That history began with the case of Morrissey v. Com-
missioner. 29 Morrissey involved the federal income tax classification of an 
organization formed as a trust under state law. Based upon the facts of 
that case, including freely transferable "share certificates" issued by the 
trust, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the trust resembled 
a corporation and therefore should be classified as an association taxable 
as a corporation. 30 The opinion discussed the various characteristics that 
distinguish associations taxable as corporations from trusts and partner-
ships, and made tax classification turn on the facial resemblance of the 
subject entity to one of those structures rather than to any policy goal 
that might be accomplished by the classification.31 Treasury regulations 
issued in 1953 further carried out this classification scheme, creating a 
bias toward corporate classification. 
In United States v. Kintner, 32 however, the taxpayer sought association 
classification. In Kintner, the taxpayer was a physician who, together with 
other physicians, formed an association that, under state law, apparently 
27. /d. 
28. /d. § 30 I. 7701-2 (as amended in 1993). 
29. 296 u.s. 344 (1935). 
30. /d. at 360. 
31. /d. 
32. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). 
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constituted a general partnership. In contrast to the Morrissey case, the 
taxpayer sought association classification so the entity would be taxable as 
a corporation. This classification would enable the organization to establish 
a qualified corporate pension plan for the benefit of its employees. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sided with the tax-
payer, holding the organization had sufficient corporate characteristics to 
qualify as an association taxable as a corporation. 33 It therefore could adopt 
a qualified corporate pension plan. 
In response to Kintner, the Treasury proposed new regulations in 1959,34 
which were adopted with certain changes in 1960 as final regulations.35 
The new regulations, which are essentially the current regulations, rep-
resented an attempt to stop non-corporate entities from obtaining the 
corporate pension plan advantages of corporations, which was particularly 
important with regard to professionals who, at the time of Kintner, gen-
erally could not incorporate under state corporate laws. 36 The regulations 
sought to accomplish this result by shifting the regulatory bias toward 
partnership classification. 
As a result of this bias shift, however, large, syndicated tax-shelter limited 
partnerships began to formY In these limited partnerships, most of the 
equity participants enjoyed limited liability, the protection generally af-
forded corporate shareholders. 38 The limited partnerships generally ob-
tained favorable pass-through treatment of income, gains, and losses by 
avoiding association classification under the new regulations. The regu-
lations designed to restrain access to corporate pension plan advantages 
therefore had the unintended effect of making it fairly easy for a non-
corporate entity formed as a limited partnership under state law to qualify 
as a partnership for federal tax purposes. 
In response to the growth of tax-shelter limited partnerships, the Trea-
sury again sought to modify its regulations to accomplish its goal of the 
moment, which was then to limit the scope of organizations that could be 
considered partnerships for tax purposes. It did this by proposing regu-
lations in 1977 that would have retained the classification approach based 
upon factors of resemblance, but inserted certain secondary corporate 
characteristics against which the entity would have to be evaluated.39 The 
Treasury, however, promptly withdrew these regulations.40 
33. /d. at 428. 
34. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701, 24 Fed. Reg. 10,450 (1959). 
35. T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409. 
36. In Montana, the practice of medicine was considered personal and a medical practice 
was prohibited from incorporating under the state law. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 5902 (1935). 
37. For a discussion of the creation of the limited partnership association, see Edward R. 
Schwartz, The Limited Partnership Association-An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small 
Business with "Control" Problems?, 20 RtrrGERS L. REv. 29 (1965). 
38. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303. 
39. Prop. Treas. Reg.§§ 301.7701-1 to -3, 42 Fed. Reg. 1038 (1977). 
40. 42 Fed. Reg. 1489 (1977). 
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After an abortive legislative attempt in 1978 to restrict partnership clas-
sification by statute to limited partnerships with no more than fifteen 
limited partners,41 the Treasury flirted once again with the use of its reg-
ulatory authority to attack the problem. This attack was accomplished 
through the issuance, in 1980, of another set of proposed regulations 
elevating unlimited liability to a status of a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for partnership classification.42 The Treasury eventually with-
drew these proposed regulations in 1982.43 Following withdrawal of these 
regulations, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) shifted emphasis 
to minimum capitalization requirements, which had been set forth in Rev-
enue Procedure 72-1344 and were reiterated in Revenue Procedure 89-
12.45 
Congress finally dealt with an aspect of the problem in 1987 with the 
enactment of section 7704 of the Code. 46 Congress's goal was to restrain 
the proliferation of publicly traded limited partnerships as a means of 
vastly increasing the number of investors eligible to benefit from pass-
through tax treatment of business entities. Section 7704 disposed of the 
problem by simply classifying most publicly traded limited partnerships as 
corporations for tax purposes.47 It is interesting that Congress achieved 
this result virtually by fiat, without any important use of the facial resem-
blance of the Treasury regulations. 48 
Analysis of LLCs Under the Current Regulations 
The Treasury's method of counting corporate characteristics for clas-
sification purposes values form more than substance. With the complicity 
of the IRS, a non-corporate entity can secure optimal tax treatment by 
avoiding a majority of corporate characteristics. It can do so, however, 
only by incurring legal expenses and other transactional costs, and wasting 
time (an opportunity cost). 
In general, LLCs will possess limited liability because no member is 
generally liable for the entity's debts. 49 Accordingly, to be classified as a 
partnership, an LLC will have to lack at least two of the remaining three 
41. See WILLIAM S. McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 
11 3.06[1] (2d ed. 1990). 
42. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(2) to -2(a)(4), -2(g) ex. (1), 45 Fed. Reg. 70,909 
(1980). 
43. I.R.S. News Release I.R. 82-145 (Dec. 16, 1982). 
44. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735. 
45. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798. 
46. H.R. REP. No. 495, I OOth Cong., 1st Sess. 950 (1987). 
4 7. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
48. For a more complete rendition of the history of the classification regulations, see 
McKEE, supra note 41, 113.06. 
49. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A-301 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 42:28-23 (West Supp. 1994). 
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corporate characteristics: centralized management, continuity of life, and 
free transferability of interests. 
Centralized Management 
An LLC run by managers who are elected by the members generally 
will possess centralized management.50 Many LLC participants, however, 
will desire centralized management for nontax reasons, because it allows 
for the more efficient management of the business that normally results 
from giving managers authority over business decisions. 
Member-managed LLCs, on the other hand, generally lack centralized 
management.51 In addition, under some circumstances, a member-man-
aged LLC whose manager must be a member can avoid possessing the 
corporate characteristics of centralized management. 52 
Free Transferability of Interests 
Free transferability of interests exists if each of the members of the 
organization (or members owning "substantially all" of the interests) has 
the power, without the consent of other members, to transfer the mem-
bership interest in a manner that substitutes the transferee for the 
member.53 That characteristic is lacking if transfers are restricted in a 
meaningful way. An LLC can be organized to lack this corporate char-
acteristic with little difficulty. 
A potential problem, however, arises with regard to the corporate char-
acteristic of free transferability of interests when the members of the LLC 
who own non-freely transferable interests are related either by blood or 
common ownership. It is possible that a close relationship among the 
members could preclude the LLC from lacking the corporate characteristic 
of free transferability of interests because the relationship of the members 
negates the effect of any transfer restrictions or the substance of any 
requirement that the members consent before any interest can be trans-
ferred.54 This is particularly problematic when the membership interests 
of a limited liability company are owned entirely by a single economic 
50. See Treas. Reg. § 30 I. 770 l-2(c). 
51. Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.03(1), 1995-3 I.R.B. 20, 23. 
52. See id. This could occur under the Treasury's regulations and IRS ruling guidelines if 
the member-managers in the aggregate own at least 20% of the total interests in the LLC 
so that, in theory, they are regarded as looking after their own interests when they manage 
the company rather than merely representing others' interests. See Treas. Reg. § 30 I. 7704-
2(c)(4) (relating to limited partnerships) and Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.03(2), supra note 51, which 
contains certain other ruling requirements for LLCs as well. 
53. Treas. Regs. § 30 I. 7704-2(e). 
54. Free transferability of interests will be lacking if such a transfer requires consent of 
a majority of nontransferring members. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.02, 1995-3 l.R.B. 20 and 
Rev. Proc. 92-33, 1992-1 C.B. 782. 
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interest, such as an individual and the individual's wholly-owned corpo-
ration. 
In Revenue Ruling 77-214,55 the IRS concluded that a German GmbH, 
an LLC-like foreign entity, possessed the corporate characteristic of free 
transferability of interests because its members were two wholly-owned 
domestic subsidiaries of a single parent corporation. 56 In that situation, 
the IRS reasoned, the parent corporation could make all the transfer 
decisions for its wholly-owned subsidiaries, despite any provision in the 
memorandum of association that might indicate otherwise.s' 
Several years later, in Revenue Ruling 93-4,58 the Service reiterated 
much of the Revenue Ruling 77-124 conclusion, noting that a provision 
requiring consent of the members was meaningless when all of the mem-
bers were commonly controlled, and that such a requirement thus could 
not cause the entity to lack free transferability of interest.59 The Service 
also indicated, however, that free transferability could still be avoided, 
even if the members are commonly controlled, if the entity's organizational 
documents either (i) flatly prohibit transfers of interest, or (ii) provide that 
a transfer triggers dissolution. 5° Based upon this statement, commentators 
have suggested that if all the owners are to be commonly controlled and 
free transferability of interest is to be avoided, the documents must be 
drafted so that transfers are flatly prohibited or that dissolution occurs 
upon any transfer. 61 
The absence of these special restrictive provisions could prove fatal to 
partnership classification. 62 Of course, on closer examination, these sug-
gestions are without much substance, because all of the commonly con-
trolled members can agree to amend the organizational documents to allow 
transfers. Nevertheless, it appears that by issuing Revenue Ruling 93-4, 
the IRS has provided a formalistic way out of what could be an intractable 
problem. Caution would suggest that the organizational documents pro-
vide both of the safeguards, namely (i) that no member may transfer a 
membership interest in the LLC and any such transfer shall be void and 
not effective, and (ii) that any attempted transfer shall result in dissolution 
of the LLC. Further, the operating agreement should provide that it may 
be amended only by vote of all of the members of the organization. Yet, 
55. Rev. Rul. 77-214, 1977-1 C.B. 408. 
56. !d. at 409. 
57. /d. 
58. Rev. Rul. 93-4, 1993-1 C.B. 225. 
59. /d. at 226. 
60. /d. 
61. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIELS. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES-TAX AND 
BUSINESS LAw 1J 2.07(5] (1994). 
62. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9433008 (May 6, 1994), in which the IRS ruled that a limited 
liability company whose members consisted of an individual and his wholly-owned S cor-
poration should be classified as an association taxable as a corporation rather than a part-
nership where the operating agreement lacked these provisions. 
HeinOnline -- 50 Bus. Law. 1005 1994-1995
Limited Liability Companies 1005 
because all LLC documents can be amended, these suggestions are without 
substantive effect. They do illustrate, however, the elective nature of this 
corporate characteristic. 
Continuity of Life 
An LLC will lack the corporate characteristic of continuity of life if it 
is dissolved upon the bankruptcy, death, dissolution, expulsion, incapacity, 
or withdrawal of any member, notwithstanding any vote to the contrary 
by all or any portion of the remaining members.63 To avoid the corporate 
characteristic of continuity of life, the LLC operating agreement, articles 
of organization, or both, or the operative state LLC law must contain a 
provision that the foregoing events will cause dissolution of the LLC, 
without further action of the members. 64 While the foregoing generally 
appears to be the rule in most states,65 even absent such a provision in 
the operating agreement or articles of organization, some states, such as 
New York, permit variations. 66 An explicit provision best assures that an 
LLC controlled by a single person or entity, in a jurisdiction such as New 
York, will lack continuity of lifeY 
The continuity of life characteristic analysis should not be affected if 
the interests of the LLC are commonly controlled. This should be the case 
even if reformation of the LLC after dissolution (e.g., because of one 
member's bankruptcy or dissolution) is assured, as a practical matter. Un-
der the IRS's later pronouncement on this subject, the presence or absence 
of separate interests (i.e., common control of the members) apparently is 
not relevant to the determination of whether an entity possesses continuity 
of life. 68 
More Than a Single Member 
The IRS has indicated that in order for an LLC to be classified as a 
partnership for federal tax purposes, it must have at least two members. 69 
It is a relatively minor matter to cause an LLC to have two members by 
using a wholly-owned corporation as the second member. In this connec-
tion, one should note that in other contexts, the IRS has recognized a 
partner as a partner for federal income tax purposes only if the partner 
has at least a one percent interest in all material items of profit, gain, loss, 
63. Treas. Reg. § 301.770 1-2(b). 
64. /d. 
65. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3228.80(5) (West Supp. 1995). 
66. The New York Limited Liability Company Law allows for the managers to continue 
the limited liability company by vote of the majority of interests remaining, absent such a 
prohibition. 1994 N.Y. Laws 576 § 701 (1994). 
67. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 5.oi, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20. 
68. Rev. Rul. 93-4, 1993-1 C.B. 225. 
69. See Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 4.01, 1995-3 I.R.B. 21. 
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cash distributions, and other allocations. 70 In fact, in a recently issued 
revenue procedure issued on December 28, 1994, the Service specifically 
stated as a requirement for receiving an advance letter ruling that in order 
for an LLC to lack continuity of life or free transferability of interests, 
"the member-managers in the aggregate must own, pursuant to the express 
terms of the operating agreement, at least a one percent interest in each 
material item of the LLC's income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit during 
the entire existence of the LLC." 71 Allowance is made, however, for so-
called regulatory allocations required under either section 704(b) or sec-
tion 704(c) and corresponding income tax regulations thereunder. 72 Cau-
tion suggests adhering to this guideline, which should not be difficult in 
most cases once the inconvenience and expense of the second member 
entity has already been suffered and the second entity has been formed. 
Thus, with regard to its proposal to abandon the classification regula-
tions, the Treasury's preliminary conclusion that there is considerable flex-
ibility under the current rules to choose the tax classification of an or-
ganization appears well taken. 73 It well behooves the Treasury, therefore, 
to search for another criterion for making the classification determination. 
CHOOSING AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF 
CLASSIFICATION 
The four characteristic test is often difficult to apply, in particular be-
cause the counting of equally weighted factors fails to define the impor-
tance of some factors relative to others. More importantly, the test is a 
failure because it does not express any policy objective for making the 
classification determination in the first place. Allowing a tax issue as im-
portant as entity-level taxation to turn on whether the entity possesses a 
majority of easily manipulatable corporate characteristics represents the 
antithesis of rational tax policy. In adopting its four characteristic test, 
the Treasury made no attempt to accomplish a policy objective other than 
precluding professional associations from qualifying as corporations74 and 
obtaining retirement tax benefits available only to corporations. 75 
This portion of the Article considers and critiques four classification 
methods as alternatives to the counting of corporate characteristic methods 
employed in the current regulations. They are the following: (i) large versus 
small, (ii) public versus private, (iii) limited liability versus unlimited lia-
bility, and (iv) a limited number of "non-pass-through shareholders," a 
70. See id. § 4.02. The IRS has taken the position, for ruling purposes, that this rule is 
subject to certain exceptions. /d. §§ 4.02, 4.03. 
71. Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 4.02, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20, 22. 
72. /d. 
73. See I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. 
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criterion similar to the principal requirement under the current S Cor-
poration rules. 
LARGE VERSUS SMALL 
Professor Curtis Berger has suggested that the distinction should be 
between large entities, which should be subject to a two-tier tax applicable 
to corporations, and small entities, which should be entitled to the pass-
through treatment generally accorded to partnerships. 76 Thus, large busi-
ness entities, whether they are structured as corporations or partnerships, 
would be subject to the two-level tax. Size would be determined by the 
enterprise's gross revenues. In contrast, all small businesses, whether or-
ganized in partnership or corporate form, would enjoy conduit treat-
ment. 77 Entities would not be subject to two-level tax until their gross 
revenues exceed an unspecified level, and even then, the two-level tax 
would apply only if the entity's gross revenues remained at that level for 
several years. 78 
If a two-level tax is the norm for business taxation, then Professor Ber-
ger's proposal would confer a subsidy upon small businesses. In contrast, 
if a single level tax were the norm (corporate tax integration), then Pro-
fessor Berger's view would impose a penalty on large businesses and there-
fore, perhaps, efficiency. Yet, Professor Berger has not sought to justify 
this subsidy or penalty on any policy grounds. Additional shortcomings of 
this approach have been identified by Professor Jerome Kurtz in connec-
tion with his alternative classification proposal. 79 
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE 
In General 
Professor Jerome Kurtz suggests that the distinction for according sin-
gle-level or dual-level taxation should be made between publicly traded 
entities and private entities. Publicly traded entities would be subject to a 
two-tier tax, but privately held entities in partnership form or LLCs would 
only be subject to a one-tier tax.80 Professor Kurtz foresees as inevitable 
that eventually most small entities will be formed as LLCs.81 He applauds 
this trend. 82 
Professor Kurtz views the publicjprivate test as superior to one based 
on gross sales for five distinct reasons. First, the public/private distinction 
76. Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation, 4 7 TAX. L. REv. 105 (1992). 
77. See id. at 106. 
78. See id. at 107. 
79. See Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business Taxation: A 
Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REv. 815 (1992). 
80. See id. at 824. 
81. See id. at 820. 
82. See id. 
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already has been made in the Code83 and, in his view, appears to be working 
well. 84 This is in contrast to the largejsmall distinction based on sales, 
which is subject to manipulation through the formation of multiple busi-
ness entities. 
Second, the publicjprivate distinction allows tax-free creation with ap-
preciated property in situations in which the transferor has not essentially 
changed economic position. 85 In contrast, when the transferor of property 
receives publicly traded and therefore marketable securities, whether cor-
porate stock or a partnership interest, the transferor has experienced a 
significant change of position. In this case, Professor Kurtz sees the im-
position of a tax as entirely appropriate. 86 
Third, the publicjprivate distinction will reduce the problems of distin-
guishing interest and compensation from dividends. 87 A private company 
normally experiences the ongoing controversy over whether its owner/ 
employees are receiving compensation for their services, which would be 
deductible by the corporation, or are receiving distributions of earnings 
(i.e., dividends), which would not be deductible by the entity. This problem 
generally does not exist in public companies, in which there is a lack of 
identity between stockholders and debt-holders and between employees 
and controlling shareholders, thereby making it much easier to distinguish 
amounts received as compensation for services from earnings distributions. 
Fourth, the administrative difficulty of allocating income among entity 
owners, whether real or perceived, when there are a large number of 
shareholders, and there are frequent transfers of those shares or other 
securities, afflicts publicly traded companies to a far higher degree than 
privately held ones. 88 Professor Kurtz believes that flow-through treatment 
for non-publicly traded entities for whom the administrative burdens are 
most easily overcome, achieves the fairest and most appropriate method 
of taxation for them. 89 This approach leaves publicly traded entities, which 
suffer the greatest administrative difficulties under flow-through treat-
ment, to the two-tier taxation regime. 
Fifth, foreseeing full integration of the corporate and individual income 
tax at some time in the future, similar to what most other countries have 
done in one form or another, a distinction between publicly traded entities 
and private entities will best allow for the transition. 90 Private entities can 
be treated under the flow-through regime, whereas publicly traded entities 
83. See I.R.C. § 7704. 
84. See Kurtz, supra note 79, at 824. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 824-25. 
88. See id. at 825. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. at 825-26. 
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can accomplish integration through an imputation credit system. 91 During 
the interim, before full integration is achieved, an appropriate line can be 
drawn between private and public based upon the number of shareholders 
and perhaps the volume of transfers. 
Elective Treatment 
The Treasury may be close to reaching this same conclusion. Recognizing 
that classification as a pass-through entity is largely elective (although com-
plicated and costly) under current law, the Treasury announced it is con-
sidering a proposal to abandon the classification factors entirely and permit 
nonpublicly traded LLCs pass-through treatment at will.92 Under the pro-
posal, if a nonpublicly traded LLC desires corporate treatment, it could 
make an affirmative election to obtain that treatment.93 
The proposal under consideration by the Treasury recognizes the ab-
surdity of classifying organizations in accordance with formal character-
istics and the expense to which such organizations are put to get assurance 
from their tax advisors that at least two of the corporate characteristics 
are absent so that partnership classification is achieved.94 In addition, the 
proposal also recognizes that it would eliminate the expense incurred by 
the IRS to verify the non-corporate classification of those entities.95 Ver-
ification requires examination of a variety of documents, relationships, 
and events, a time-consuming process, to the end of determining whether 
the subject entity has fallen into one of the many traps for the unwary. 
The confluence of provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,96 the 
provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198 7, 97 and the 
IRS's own concession in 1988 that a Wyoming LLC could qualify as a 
partnership,98 make the proposed approach possible. The Wyoming LLC 
concession, the most important element, spawned the enactment of LLC 
91. Under an imputation credit system, the corporate tax is viewed as a withholding tax 
on shareholders' income. When the corporation makes an actual or constructive distribution 
of income, the shareholders are treated as receiving both the distributed earnings and the 
corporate tax paid on those earnings. See id. 
92. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 l.R.B. 7. Elective treatment would be specifically pre-
cluded for LLCs governed by l.R.C. § 7704. 
93. Indeed, the Treasury is also considering expanding this elective approach to corporate 
entities as well. See Treasury Not Locked into Approach Taken in Business Status Proposal, Official 
Says, DAILY TAX REP., May 12, 1995, at G-3. 
94. /d. 
95. /d. 
96. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
97. H.R. 3545, 100th Cong., lst Sess., 101 Stat. 1330 (1987). 
98. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. See supra note 13 
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statutes in virtually every state in the ensuing few years99 and permitted 
entrepreneurs to obtain the most significant benefits of incorporation and 
yet enjoy the pass-through and flexible tax benefits of partnership status. 
In addition, the enactment of section 469 (Passive Activity Loss Rules) 
under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly limited tax shelter ben-
efits.100 It thereby substantially reduced the revenue losses that could result 
from more freely available loss pass-through attributes of partnerships. 
Thereafter, in 1987, Congress created a category of "publicly traded 
partnerships" that are generally treated like C Corporations. 101 This leg-
islation was intended to accomplish several objectives: assure the appli-
cation of corporate level tax to publicly owned business entities in order 
to protect the corporate tax revenue base, deny tax shelter benefits to 
publicly traded tax shelter partnerships, 102 and deter conversion of cor-
porate business entities to partnerships after individual income tax rates 
had been reduced to a level below corporate tax rates by the 1986 Act. 
These developments over the last decade have permitted the Treasury 
to consider the complete abandonment of the four characteristic test of 
partnership classification with little risk of sacrificing a great deal of rev-
99. ALA. CoDE§§ IO-I2-I to -6I (I994); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.§§ 29-60I to -857 (Supp. 
I994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-I OI to -I3I6 (Michie Supp. I994); Cow. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 7-80-IOI to -9I3 (West Supp. I994); I993 Conn. Pub. Acts 267 (West); DEL. CoDE ANN. 
tit. 6, §§ I8-I 0 I to -II 07 (Supp. I994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.40 I-.5I4 (West Supp. I995); 
GA. CoDE ANN.§§ I4-II-IOO to -II09 (I994); IDAHO ConE§§ 53-60I to -672 (1994); ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 805, paras. I80/I-I to 60-I (Smith-Hurd Supp. I995); IND. CODE 
ANN.§§ 23-I8-I-I to-I3-I (Burns I995);IowACODEANN. §§ 490A.IOO-.I60I (Supp.I994); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ I7-760 I to -7652 (Supp. I994); I994 Ky. S.B. I84; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§§ I2:I30I-I369 (West I994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 3I, §§ 60I-75I (West I994); Mo. 
ConE ANN., CoRPS. & Ass'Ns §§ 4A-I OI to -II 03 (1993 & Supp. I994); MICH. CoMP. LAws 
ANN.§§ 450.4I OI-.5200 (West Supp. I994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§§ 322B.OI-.960 (West I995); 
Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 79-29-IOI to -I20I (Supp. I994); Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 347.0I0-.740 
(Vernon Supp. I995); MoNT. CoDE ANN.§§ 35-8-IOI to -I307 (1994); NEB. REv. STAT.§§ 2I-
260 I to -2645 (Supp. 1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.0 I 0-.57I (Michie I994); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN.§§ 304-C:l to :85 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 42:2B-l to -70 (West Supp. 
1994); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 53-I9-l to -74 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 57C-I-
Ol to -10-07 (1993); N.D. CENT. CoDE§§ I0-32-01 to -155 (Supp. I994); OHIO REv. CoDE 
ANN. §§ 1705.01-.58 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. I8, §§ 2000-2060 (West 
Supp. I995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 7-I6-1 to -75 
(1992 & Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 4 7-34-1 to -59 (Supp. 1994); TENN. CoDE 
ANN.§§ 48-201-101 to -248-606 (Supp. 1994); TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West 
Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 48-2b-IOI to -157 (1994 & Supp. I994); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 13.I-1000 to -1073 (Michie I993 & Supp. I994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§§ 25.I5.005-
.902 (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. ConE §§ 31-IA-I to -69 (Supp. I994); Wis. STAT. 
§§ 183.0 I 02-.1305 (West Supp. I994); Wvo. STAT. §§ 17-IS-1 01 to -I43 (1989 and Supp. 
1994). 
I 00. I.R.C. § 469 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
I 0 I. See id. § 7704. 
102. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of I988, Pub. L. No. I00-647 § 2004, 
I988-3 L.B 473 (1988); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of I987, H.R. 3545, IOOth 
Cong., I st Sess. (1987). 
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enue. Indeed, the Treasury does not believe its proposal will result in any 
revenue loss whatever, 103 although that belief appears to some observers 
to be somewhat optimistic. 
On balance, the Treasury's consideration of the publicjprivate dichot-
omy and an elective approach appears to be very realistic and would ac-
complish a great deal of tax simplification, to be welcomed by taxpayers, 
if not the tax lawyers who worried about and planned around the classi-
fication factors at their normal hourly rates. 
A Caution 
While Professor Kurtz has set forth several compelling practical reasons 
for adopting the publicjprivate dichotomy for entity classification, 104 it 
nevertheless appears that basing tax treatment on this dichotomy creates 
some negative and unfortunate tax incentives. Adoption of this dividing 
line would create a tax incentive for a business to remain private, thereby 
impeding the free and efficient flow of capital to the business. Whereas 
capital could flow to the business in the form of debt, there would be a 
significant penalty in the form of an extra layer of income tax, imposed 
at the entity level on all of the entity's income, if the entity were to seek 
its capital from prospective equity-holders in the public market. Privately 
held companies would have a competitive advantage over publicly held 
companies, an advantage that cannot be justified on any grounds other 
than the administrative convenience to which Professor Kurtz points. 105 
LIMITED LIABILITY 
The single distinguishing feature between a corporation and a sole pro-
prietorship may be the existence of limited liability accorded the corpo-
ration. This corporate feature is what isolates the responsibility for cor-
porate actions to the assets of the corporation and not the separate assets 
of the owners of the corporation, and therefore forces the commercial 
world to view the corporation as a person, separate and apart from its 
owners, whose assets are protected from the liabilities of the corporation. 
This aspect also allows corporations to attract other owners, whose risk 
of loss is limited by the amount of capital contributed to the corporation. 
In 1980, the Treasury proposed regulations that would have elevated 
limited liability to a determining factor. 106 The proposed regulations pro-
vided as follows: "[T]he term 'partnership' can apply only to an organi-
zation some member of which is personally liable for debts of the orga-
I 03. Treasury Officials Discuss Entity Choice of Tax Status, 133 CoNe. REc. H 11967 (Dec. 
21, 1987). 
104. See Kurtz, supra note 79. 
105. See id. 
106. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980). 
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nization. Because a limited liability company does not satisfy this condition, 
it cannot be classified as a partnership." 107 After receiving significant com-
ments in opposition to the proposed regulation, including questions re-
garding whether the Treasury had the authority to promulgate such a 
regulation, the Treasury withdrew its proposed regulations in 1982, con-
temporaneously announcing the beginning of a study project to review 
whether partnership taxation applied to entities in which no member is 
personally liable. 108 It concluded that study in 1988 with the issuance of 
the Wyoming LLC revenue ruling, 109 in which the IRS ruled that limited 
liability was simply one of four factors, no more or less important than 
any of the other three factors. 110 The IRS concluded that an LLC, orga-
nized in Wyoming under a statute authorizing the creation of a new form 
of business organization known as the limited liability company, 111 could 
be classified as a partnership even though no member was liable for any 
of the entity's debts, because the organization lacked two of the other 
three factors. 112 
The current Treasury regulations continue to recognize the importance 
of limited liability as a classification factor in distinguishing between part-
nerships and associations, which are taxable as corporations, but make it 
only one of four equally weighted factors, together with continuity of life, 
centralized management, and free transferability of interest. 113 Under the 
current Treasury regulations, an organization that lacks any two of these 
factors, even if it has limited liability, will be classified as a partnership 
rather than as an association. 114 
The goal of tax policy relating to integration or two-level tax should be 
tax neutrality, that is, to minimize the effect on the economy of the tax 
decision involved in classification. Arguably, there should be complete 
integration for all businesses, including sole proprietorships, partnerships, 
limited liability companies, and corporations. The state does, however, 
bestow a special benefit that some of these entities enjoy, giving them a 
competitive advantage in the market for capital. Corporations, LLCs, and 
limited partnerships enjoy this special benefit: limited liability. These forms 
of companies are able to take greater risks because their owners are in-
sulated from those risks. Limited liability is a function of the legal fiction 
that corporations and corporation-like entities are persons, separate and 
apart from their true owners. A separate tax on entities that enjoy limited 
liability might be viewed as equalizing the relative government-bestowed 
107. /d. 
I 08. See supra note 43. 
109. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
110. /d. at 361. 
Ill. Wvo. STAT.§§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977). 
112. /d. The entity lacked continuity of life and free transferability of interest. 
113. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.S. 20. 
114./d. 
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benefits and detriments among these entities. Accordingly, so long as cor-
porations are subject to entity level taxation, non-corporate entities that 
possess their market advantages, namely limited liability, arguably should 
also be subject to that treatment. 
On the other hand, there are difficulties with using limited liability as 
the single determinant. First, S Corporations, which e~oy limited liability, 
are generally subject to only shareholder level taxation. 115 Subjecting LLCs 
to entity-level taxation because of their limited liability, while excusing S 
Corporations from that tax, appears to be inconsistent. Perhaps the dis-
tinction can be viewed as a matter of legislative grace to so-called "Small 
Corporations." But, why should that grace not be extended to "Small 
LLCs" as well? 
Second, sometimes the characteristic of limited liability is achieved in 
practical terms, even though the entity form is technically not one that 
provides limited liability protection. In those situations, the limited liability 
characteristic may be an inappropriate determinant of the entity's tax 
treatment. This inappropriateness is more troubling in the context of the 
pass-through of losses than the avoidance of entity-level taxation of in-
come. In transactions in which loss pass-through is an important objective, 
the treatment of liabilities is frequently a determinant of the taxpayer's 
choice of entity among the pure pass-through partnership, the modified 
pass-through S Corporation, and non-pass-through C Corporation. Inclu-
sion of partnership nonrecourse liabilities in outside as well as inside basis 
essentially allows partners to deduct amounts in excess of amounts con-
tributed or promised to the activity. 116 Justified as merely equating a part-
ner's treatment to a co-owner's treatment of the activity, nonrecourse 
liabilities allow partners to achieve loss pass-through treatment and yet 
enjoy limited liability. 
Put differently, if Crane v. Commissioner117 had been decided differently 
and the United States Supreme Court had held that nonrecourse liabilities 
assumed or taken subject to in the acquisition of property were not in-
cludable in the property's basis, then the controversy over limited liability 
in the area of entity classification would be of much less import. Pass-
through loss deductions would be limited to actual cash invested or prom-
ised for which a taxpayer has personal liability. This would correspond to 
the entity's own basis inclusion for liabilities. In substance, this change 
115. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1377 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 1366 allows for pass-through 
of income to the shareholder in proportion to the shareholder's ownership interest. The 
income retains the character it had when received by the entity. ld. § 1366. 
116. I.R.C. § 752; Treas. Regs. §§ 1. 752-1 to -5. 
11 7. 331 U.S. 1 (194 7). In Crane, the Court held that a person who acquires depreciable 
property subject to an unassumed mortgage, and later sells the property still encumbered, 
realizes gain on the sale that includes the liability. ld. at 14. 
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would have reduced the tax differences between partnership treatment 
and S Corporation treatment (and, of course, C Corporation treatment). 118 
The point is that an entity that does not possess the protection of limited 
liability under law can effectively obtain much of that protection by pro-
viding for nonrecourse treatment with its creditors. Although this may not 
be likely with trade creditors and potential tort plaintiffs (although ade-
quate insurance likely would be available), it can often be achieved with 
regard to loans secured by real estate or other property. Nevertheless, the 
areas in which liability protection cannot be achieved may very well be 
sufficient to impose significant risks on owners of the entity to fairly char-
acterize them as not being protected by limited liability. 
This suggestion of drawing the one-leveljtwo-level tax distinction based 
upon limited liability is not consistent with the direction that the courts 
in decisions, 119 the Treasury in regulations, 120 and the IRS in revenue 
rulings have taken. 121 Indeed, to attempt to draw this distinction at this 
point in tax history, as indicated, would require a substantial amount of 
back-peddling. It would also not be without administrative difficulty be-
cause an entity such as a limited partnership, which has a general partner 
with unlimited liability, might have to be treated partly as a pass-through 
entity and partly as a taxable entity. But this complication results from the 
historical creation of limited partnerships to take advantage of pass-
through treatment even where limited liability exists. The partial entity 
treatment described would be more of a problem for existing limited part-
nerships than for future limited partnerships which, in all likelihood, would 
be few and far between under this regime. Absent tax considerations, most 
of the limited partnership's limited partners likely would prefer to own 
corporate stock than limited partnership interests, or senior LLC mem-
bership interests. 
If, however, limited liability is not to be the determining factor in entity 
classification, then why should corporations be entitled to that same treat-
ment regardless of whether they satisfy S corporation requirements? 122 
Limited liability, after all, is the most important non-tax reason for in-
corporating. 
The Treasury's most recent willingness to consider the adoption of the 
public/private dichotomy for LLCs, while it should be applauded as a clear 
118. It would also have eliminated the need for the at-risk rules of I.R.C. § 465 (generally 
limited losses to amounts invested by the taxpayer for which the taxpayer bears the economic 
risk of loss) and a large portion of the passive activity loss rules of I.R.C. § 469 (generally 
deferring losses from passive activities until a taxpayer has passive income or disposes of the 
activity). 
119. See, e.g., Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq. 1979-2 C.B. 2. 
120. Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993). 
121. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
122. See Treasury's most recent suggestion referenced supra note 93. The Treasury also 
pointed out, however, that two level tax applicable to corporations is statutory. /d. 
HeinOnline -- 50 Bus. Law. 1015 1994-1995
Limited Liability Companies 1015 
improvement over its current four characteristic test, leads one to question 
why a similar dichotomy should not be adopted for corporations as well. 
Indeed, if limited liability, the single significant advantage afforded cor-
porate shareholders, is not a determinant factor in imposing entity level 
taxation on LLCs, then it would seem that nonpublicly held corporations 
also should be permitted single level, partnership taxation for precisely 
the same policy reasons as LLCs, without regard to the current S cor-
poration requirements. This change would have to be effected legislatively. 
If such a statutory change were made, however, then choice of entity could 
be made for purely business reasons, rather than tax considerations. 
S CORPORATION CRITERIA: THE NUMBER OF 
OWNERS 
Another alternative for distinguishing between single tax entities and 
double tax entities is the number of owners. This factor is one of the most 
important features used in subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code to 
distinguish essentially single tax S Corporations from double tax C Cor-
porations.123 
When the Treasury originally established the limit of ten S Corporation 
shareholders in 1958,124 the design was intended for small businesses, and 
simplicity was an important goal. A limitation on the number of share-
holders achieved administrative simplicity because the corporation's treat-
ment of items of income or deduction (and IRS auditing of that treatment) 
could affect no more than ten tax returns. 125 Amendments to the statute 
to allow additional shareholders, ultimately up to thirty-five under the 1982 
amendment, 126 compromised that simplicity somewhat. Nevertheless, a lim-
itation based on the number of owners does provide a clear dividing line 
(although circumvention is possible by stacking entities) in subchapter S. 
The possibility of manipulation in this manner in the S Corporation context 
is precluded by requiring that only individuals (and certain trusts and 
estates)1 27 can be shareholders. 128 A similar requirement could be imposed 
on LLCs, although that would now require a major change in state LLC 
laws. Alternatively, LLC ownership could be limited to a fixed number of 
non-pass-through owners such as individuals and C Corporations. Under 
this rule, the number of taxpayers whose tax liabilities could be affected 
123. See I.R.C. § 1361 (limiting the number of shareholders in an S Corporation to 35). 
Under S Corporation eligibility, the shareholders must be individuals who are not nonresident 
aliens. /d. § 1361 (b)(l ). 
124. /d.§ 137l(a)(J) (1958). 
125. jAMES S. EUSTICE &jOEL D. KUNTZ, fEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS 
~ 1.03[2J[b] (3d. ed. 1993). 
126. H.R. REP. No. 6055, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
127. I.R.C. § 1361 (b)(l )(B), (c)(2), (c)(3), (d). 
128. S Corporations, however, can be partners in a larger partnership. 
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by the LLC's taxable income would be limited to the fixed number, which 
is one of the principal goals of setting a maximum number of permissible 
owners. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of the four alternatives, (i) large versus small, (ii) public versus 
private, (iii) limited liability versus unlimited liability, and (iv) large number 
of owners versus small number of owners has some appeal to policy ob-
jectives in the tax law. In this sense, any one of the alternatives is preferable 
to the current four-factor test employed by the Treasury Regulations. 
Moreover, the choice of any alternative would obviate the need to create 
a brand new institution known as "limited liability companies" in fifty 
different states plus the District of Columbia. Any of these alternative tests, 
arguably, could be adopted and arguments could be made in its favor. 
Instead, the Treasury for many years chose to retain its four-factor test, 
for which no substantial arguments can be made. Moreover, Congress was 
also unwilling to adopt any of these alternative tests. 
More recently, however, the Treasury and the IRS appear willing to 
permit taxpayers to choose the kind of treatment they desire: pass-through 
or two-level taxation. They first indicated their flexibility when the IRS, 
publishing a revenue ruling permitting classification of LLCs as partner-
ships (and therefore pass-through entities), 129 even though the Treasury's 
own classification regulations could have been amended to provide other-
wise, and most recently, in the Treasury's consideration of elective treat-
ment for non-publicly traded LLCs. Congress has thus far remained silent 
on this decision. 
This new flexibility, however, has spawned an essentially new entity, the 
LLC, in virtually every state, 130 thereby necessitating the creation of a 
whole new body of law with all the resulting uncertainty that entails. This 
has happened almost by accident, and not as part of a purposeful effort 
to accomplish some social or economic goal that could not have been 
achieved through corporations, whose law has been developed with great 
sophistication for generations, if not centuries. A long-term failure of 
Congress, the Treasury, and the IRS to define and articulate in the tax 
law the basic policies implicit in business taxation has forced state law 
makers to adapt to a wholly formalistic means of determining tax status. 
The net result is the LLC, an ingenious invention that allows partners to 
achieve both pass-through status and limited liability. It does so, however, 
by forcing a turn away from the well-established jurisprudence of cor-
porate and partnership law, and to devise a pastiche of law for a new entity 
that exists only because the classification rules are so absurd. 
129. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. 
130. See supra note 99 (listing states that have adopted LLC statutes). 
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The conclusions and observations in this Article are that policymakers 
have allowed the tax tail to wag the economic dog. Certainty and pre-
dictability are important objectives of law. These generally exist when the 
corporate form is used because of the long history of case law interpreting 
corporate provisions and rights and responsibilities of officers, directors, 
and shareholders. Certainty and predictability are sacrificed by the creation 
of tax incentives for the new and uncertain entity form known as the limited 
liability company. No one looking at the entire picture, tax and non-tax, 
would have suggested replacement of corporations with LLCs as a rational 
policy direction. Yet, it is occurring, and, until recently, much of the aca-
demic writing about it concentrated on the kind of trees that should be 
planted and not whether the new forest is desirable. 
It may be asked whether the confusion of policy described in this Article 
has not only confused tax law, but also spawned undesirably complex and 
costly legal innovation. Certainty and predictability are important objec-
tives of law. These historically have existed when the corporate or part-
nership forms are used because of the long history of statutory and case 
law interpreting the rights and responsibilities of officers, directors, share-
holdhers, and partners. Certainty and predictability have been threatened 
by the creation of tax incentives for the new and uncertain entity form 
known as the limited liability company. If one had stood back, before the 
proliferation of LLCs, to take a look at the question of how businesses 
should be taxed, it is doubtful that one would have proposed the solution 
of wholesale replacement of traditional entities by a novel hybrid through 
a state-by-state free-for-all. 
On the other hand, the law develops untidily, and it can be argued that 
the free-for-all among the states in their competition to produce the most 
attractive and functional LLC statute shows the market for law, which has 
propelled the LLC to prominence, operating efficiently. Indeed, the timing 
of the IRS's recent proposal suggests that the LLC phenomenon may have 
forced legal change that ultimately may result in a tax regime that expressly 
serves some coherent policy goal, and in the development of a new and 
highly adaptable form of entity whose present uncertainty may simply be 
a transitional cost. Indeed, the LLC may simply be a stepping stone to a 
more widely used form of partnership, the limited liability partnership. 
Judgment will have to be reserved, however, until both the immediate fate 
and the long-term effects of the changes are known. 
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